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Abstract
Why have economic reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state been successful in some
cases but not others? Are reform failures the consequence of leviathan states that hinder private
economic activity, or of weak states unable to implement policies effectively and provide a
supportive institutional environment? We explore these questions in a study of privatization in
postcommunist Russia. Taking advantage of large regional variation in the size of public
administrations, and employing a multilevel re-search design that controls for pre-privatization
selection in the estimation of regional privatization effects, we examine the relationship between
state bureaucracy and the impact of privatization on firm productivity. We find that privatization
is more effective in regions with relatively large bureaucracies. Our analysis suggests that this
effect is driven by the impact of bureaucracy on the post-privatization business environment,
with better institutional support and less corruption when bureaucracies are large.
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State University, Heriot-Watt University, the Ronald Coase Institute, the University of California
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Introduction

In recent decades economic reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state in the economy
have swept the developing and formerly communist worlds. Yet despite high hopes, the effect
of these reforms has been sharply uneven. Why have similar economic reforms been successful
in some environments but not others? Are reform failures the consequence of leviathan
states that hinder private economic activity, or of weak states unable to implement policies
effectively and provide a supportive institutional environment? We explore these questions
in a study of privatization in postcommunist Russia. Taking advantage of large variation
across Russia’s regions in the size of public administrations, and employing a multilevel
research design that controls for pre-privatization selection in the estimation of regional
privatization effects, we examine the relationship between state bureaucracy and the impact
of privatization on firm productivity.
The role of the state in economic reforms has been central to the study of postcommunist
transitions. In response to the sometimes disappointing outcome of these reforms, especially
in the countries of the former Soviet Union, many have stressed what seems to be the
particularly dysfunctional nature of postsocialist bureaucracies (e.g., Frye and Zhuravskaya,
2000; Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000). Beyond this general consensus, however, there
is little agreement on whether the problem is too much of the wrong kind of state, one
that projects a “grabbing hand,” or not enough of the right kind of state, one unable to
offer a “helping hand” (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). Certainly rent-seeking bureaucrats raise
the cost of doing business in postcommunist countries, a fact established in various crossnational enterprise surveys (e.g., EBRD, 2005). That said, the bureaucracies of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union are not large by world standards, and some—most
notably Russia’s—are in fact quite small (Brym and Gimpelson, 2004).1 Together with
the relative difficulty of extracting tax revenues in many postcommunist countries (e.g.,
Treisman, 1999; Gehlbach, 2008), this has led some observers to characterize postsocialist
states as more “incapable” than “grabbing” (Easter, 2002), unable to enforce contracts,
implement antitrust and bankruptcy laws, and generally provide an environment conducive
to private economic activity (Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, 2002).
In principle, bureaucracy size could affect reform outcomes for a number of distinct reasons.
Larger bureaucracies might have greater capacity, which could be used for good or ill. Postcommunist governments were asked to perform tasks fundamentally different from those of
their communist predecessors, and those with larger bureaucracies may have found it easier
to implement reforms effectively and provide the necessary legal and regulatory infrastructure. Alternatively, more capacious states may have found it easier to interfere, predating
and erecting barriers that negated the intended effects of reform. The size of the bureaucracy could also affect the incentives of bureaucrats, an argument associated especially with
Shleifer and Vishny (1993). On the one hand, the power of any individual bureaucrat to
1

Goldsmith (1999) makes a similar point with respect to African bureaucracies. Schiavo-Campo, de
Tommaso and Mukherjee (1997) report that 0.8 percent of the Russian population is employed in government
administration, versus an unweighted average across postcommunist countries of 1.9 percent and across
OECD countries of 4.3 percent.
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extract rents might be less when there are many competing bureaucrats able to provide
the same service (e.g., license or permit), improving the institutional environment for private economic activity. On the other hand, if a larger bureaucracy implies that functions
are subdivided into various services that are complementary from a private actor’s point of
view, then each additional bureaucrat may act as a “toll taker” who fails to internalize the
impact of his “toll” (e.g., bribe) on the demand for other bureaucrats’ services.2 In sum,
there are reasons to expect either a positive or negative impact of bureaucracy size on reform
outcomes, though the actual direction of the effect is an empirical rather than a theoretical
question.
These concerns are of particular importance to postcommunist privatization, the central policy in the effort to transform economies oriented around public ownership and bureaucratic
coordination into ones where private economic activity and market coordination predominate. The premise was that the profit-motivated owners of privatized enterprises would engage in active restructuring to improve their firms’ performance. Unlike passive state-owned
enterprises, privatized firms were expected to invest in new technology and equipment, to lay
off surplus labor or restructure their workforces, and to develop improved or completely new
products and markets. In each of these cases, the active participation and cooperation of the
bureaucracy would be essential. A bureaucracy geared toward grabbing, or one that was simply incapable, could raise the costs of any actions that the new private owners might want to
carry out, and in the limit might prevent any improvements from taking place. In contrast,
a bureaucracy oriented toward helping would issue the necessary permits and approvals and
provide the complementary infrastructure that would reduce the costs of restructuring. The
opportunities for bureaucratic influence—both predatory and supportive—are therefore especially important for privatized firms, such that an examination of the relationship between
state bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness offers an important test of the role of the
state in market-oriented economic reforms.
To explore the relationship between state bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness, we exploit a unique panel data set on the performance of nearly 25,000 state-owned and privatized
firms in 77 Russian regions, taking advantage of large regional variation in bureaucracy size
for reasons exogenous to the postcommunist transition. Using statistical methods originally
developed to control for selection bias in labor-market programs, we estimate the impact of
privatization on firm performance at the regional level while controlling for the possibilities
that better-performing firms and firms with better prospects were more likely to be selected
for privatization. We find large variation in the impact of privatization on multifactor productivity. We then examine region-level determinants of estimated regional privatization
effectiveness, focusing especially on the size of state bureaucracy, measured as the number of
employees in public administration (not public employment more generally), controlling for
population. This focus on within-country variation allows us to hold constant many features
of the macroeconomic environment and privatization-policy design that vary across countries, while focusing on institutional variation as an explanation for variation in privatization
2

If bureaucrats collude, then the total bribe is independent of the number of bureaucrats. The perfect
collusion cited by Shleifer and Vishny in the cases of monarchies and “old-time Communist regimes” may,
however, be harder to maintain when the number of bureaucrats is large.
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outcomes.
We find that privatization has a larger (more positive) effect on firm performance in regions
with relatively large state bureaucracies. The estimated effect—which controls for regional
differences in industrial structure—is quite large and robust to model specification (including estimation by OLS, FGLS, and 2SLS), choice of sample, and the inclusion of numerous
controls. Differences in the predicted effectiveness of privatization in regions with large
and small bureaucracies are comparable in magnitude to observed differences in privatization effectiveness across postcommunist countries. Our estimates suggest that this effect is
driven by increases in the performance of privatized firms in regions with relatively large
bureaucracies rather than decreases in the performance of state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, we find that of the three categories of bureaucrats for which we have disaggregated
data, the impact on privatization effectiveness is limited to variation in the size of regional
executive-branch bureaucracies, which plausibly have the greatest influence over the regional
business environment. We observe little evidence that state bureaucracy influences privatization effectiveness through privatization-program implementation, as might be the case if
more effective owners were selected in regions with relatively large bureaucracies. In contrast, we find some evidence using data from two recent surveys of Russian firms that the size
of regional bureaucracies affects the post-privatization business environment, with private
firms in regions with relatively large bureaucracies reporting shorter waiting times and fewer
bribes when dealing with bureaucrats.
Beyond their role in helping to understand the role of the state in economic reform, the
results in this paper contribute more generally to the literature on state administration as
a key factor in explaining economic development. Cross-national studies have borne out
Weber’s insight that the character of the bureaucracy matters for growth (e.g., Knack and
Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Evans and Rauch, 1999). Somewhat surprisingly, however, given
the central role that the state plays in theories of economic development, relatively little is
known about the empirical relationship between the size of the bureaucracy and economic
performance.3 As we show below, state-owned as well as privatized enterprises appear to be
better off in regions with relatively large bureaucracies, implying that economic performance
overall may be positively related to the size of the bureaucracy. Extending the analysis to
other aspects of economic performance and other countries is an important agenda for future
research.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on postcommunist privatization and firm performance, emphasizing the puzzles that have been raised by this research
and how our paper helps to address them. In Section 3 we introduce our data, and in Section
4 we discuss our empirical strategy. Our main findings are presented in Section 5, where we
establish a positive relationship between state bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness.
We explore two alternative mechanisms through which this relationship might operate in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
3

There has been some theoretical investigation. See, e.g., Acemoglu and Verdier (2000).
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2

Research on postcommunist privatization and firm
performance

The design of privatization policies and their consequences for firm performance have been
among the most discussed and researched issues in postcommunist Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. From the early 1990s, many policymakers and observers viewed privatization as the linchpin of a strategy to improve managerial incentives, encourage firm
restructuring, and generally effect a shift to a “private property regime” (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994, p. 169). The initial enthusiasm for ownership change led in most countries
to rapid divestment through programs of “mass privatization,” which generally used vouchers for citizens to acquire shares (Blanchard et al., 1993; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995).
Some of these programs also gave special preferences to employees of the companies concerned, leading to large-scale ownership by managers and workers, in degrees varying with
the design of the program and with the particular outcomes for each company. The emphasis
on privatization became decidedly less fashionable later in the 1990s, as many critics argued
that the programs had either done little good and resulted in misplaced priorities—for instance, by neglecting institutional change—or had actually caused damage—for example, by
facilitating asset-stripping (e.g., Stiglitz, 1999; Roland, 2001).
Yet until very recently the empirical support for either of these positions was quite weak. The
pro-privatization enthusiasm at the beginning of transition had little or no relevant previous
experience that could serve as its basis, and there had been few systematic studies by the
late 1990s to corroborate the negative views of the critics. The little evidence available
to support such evaluations was limited to either macroeconomic performance indicators
or detailed observations of a few firms. Just as the critics’ position, which was part of a
broader attack on the “Washington consensus,” seemed to become dominant, a surge of
statistical studies of privatized firms appeared. These studies, as summarized in reviews
by Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002), tended to find positive
effects of privatization on measures of firm performance in many countries. But the studies
suffered from enough methodological weaknesses to make them ineffective in persuading most
skeptics.
Among the important methodological problems in most research on the firm-performance
effects of privatization are small sample size and short time series, with concomitant inability
to conduct meaningful comparisons and control for selection bias in the privatization process.
Short of a randomized experiment, an analysis of privatization effects requires detailed panel
data with a large enough number of privatized and state-owned firms within industries and
a long time series of observations on each firm before and after the privatization process.
Yet nearly all studies until the early 2000s used survey samples of at most a few hundred
firms, and the data were either cross-sectional or at best had only a few years of data. The
small samples made it difficult to carry out appropriate comparisons, so that privatized
firms in some industries were evaluated relative to state-owned firms in others. The short
time series made it difficult to take into account possible biases in the selection of firms
to be privatized. For example, if firms with inherently higher productivity or more rapidly
growing productivity have a higher probability of privatization, then a simple comparison of
4

pre- and post-privatization performance would result in a positively biased estimate of the
true privatization effect.
These methodological issues have been addressed in more recent research, in particular by
Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006). Their results for Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine
provide much stronger support for the earlier conclusion of the Djankov and Murrell (2002)
survey that the effect of privatization is considerably stronger in Eastern Europe than the
CIS.4 The pattern across countries raises some puzzles, however: while the effect of privatization to foreign investors on productivity is uniformly positive and large (generally 20–40
percent, depending on the precise specification), the effect of privatization with new domestic owners is largest in Romania (14–24 percent), followed by Hungary (5–15 percent)
and Ukraine (2–4 percent).5 The estimates are actually negative for Russia, and although
small in magnitude (-3 to -5 percent), they are always statistically significantly different
from zero. Further analysis of the dynamics of these effects shows that while in Hungary,
Romania, and Ukraine the impact of privatization tended to be fairly immediate, i.e., in the
first post-privatization year (with a slight lag in Ukraine), in Russia the initial effect was
distinctly negative and progressively worse through the first four post-privatization years,
with a modest positive impact appearing only after about seven years.
Why does the effectiveness of privatization vary so much, and why is the Russian effect
zero or even negative? A leading hypothesis is that institutional variation across countries
plays a role in producing these divergent outcomes—Miller and Tenev (2007) write, for
example, that Russian privatization was “implemented in an environment of a weak state,
which did not have the capacity to protect its ownership rights and coordinate reforms”—
but this explanation alone is inconsistent with the finding that Romania’s privatization
impact is larger than Hungary’s, and Ukraine’s larger than Russia’s.6 The much debated
methods of privatization might also be part of the answer, and that explanation is certainly
consistent with the much larger and more uniform effect of ownership by foreign investors,
but it does not fully account for the cross-country differences in the estimates. Among other
candidate explanations, Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) find little systematic variation in
effectiveness of privatization by cohort (which could arise due to different methods being used
across time or learning about how to implement privatization more effectively), calendar year
(different macroeconomic conditions or business environments across time), growth in the
firm’s industry, or industrial composition.
A major difficulty in these attempts to identify the source of variation in privatization effectiveness is that the very small number of countries for which careful estimates of priva4
Djankov and Murrell (2002) estimate privatization effects for two regions (Eastern Europe and CIS)
from a meta-analysis of studies that typically rely on cross-section data (or very short panels) from a wide
variety of sources (mostly small firm surveys and some individual data), use different econometric methods
from one another, and analyze outcomes other than productivity (e.g., sales, new products, wage arrears,
debt default, qualitative restructuring, successful transactions, etc.).
5
The ranges given here depend on whether the specification allows for firm-specific time trends or merely
includes firm fixed effects, a methodological issue discussed in Section 4 below.
6
The World Bank’s (1996) four-group classification of 26 transition economies, for example, puts Hungary
in the first group of leading reformers, Romania in the second group, Russia in the third, and Ukraine in
the fourth.
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tization effectiveness are available precludes reliable statistical analysis. Moreover, there is
substantial variation across postcommunist countries in privatization design and macroeconomic performance, both of which may affect institutional development and privatization
performance, and thus much heterogeneity that is difficult to hold constant in cross-national
comparisons. Our focus on Russia in this paper allows us to take advantage of institutional
variation across a comparatively large number of regions, as well as variation in the impact
of privatization on firm performance. We are thus able to more carefully investigate one
candidate explanation for cross-sectional variation in privatization effectiveness, even while
holding privatization design and the macroeconomic environment constant. Our particular
emphasis on state bureaucracy addresses the fundamental question about postcommunist
institutions raised above: is the problem too much of the wrong state, or not enough of the
right one?

3

Data

We use panel data on manufacturing enterprises in Russia to estimate the effect of privatization on firm-level total factor productivity by region. The firm-level data are collected by the
Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Russian successor to the corresponding agency
in the USSR. The basic statistical methodologies and data collection mechanisms have remained unchanged through this period. We combine information from industrial-enterprise
registries with joint-venture registries and balance-sheet data to construct comprehensive
data and fill in missing values.
According to the Federal State Statistics Service, the industrial registries are supposed to
include all industrial firms with more than 100 employees, plus those that are more than
25 percent owned by the state and/or by legal entities that are themselves included in the
registry. In fact, the practice seems to be that once firms enter the registries, they continue
to report even if the original conditions for inclusion are no longer satisfied. The data
may therefore be taken as corresponding to the “old” sector of firms (and their successors)
inherited from the Soviet system. Certainly with respect to this set of firms, the databases
are quite comprehensive. At the beginning of the transition process in 1992, the firms in
the Russian industrial registry accounted for 91 percent of officially reported total industrial
employment. The Russian data are available as an unbalanced panel from 1985 to 2004.
We exclude non-manufacturing sectors and non-profit organizations from this data set. To
focus on the effects of privatization with a relatively homogeneous comparison group, we also
include only firms that are state-owned on entry into the database. Finally, we retain firmyears in the sample only when they contain complete information, which does not reduce the
sample appreciably. The resulting sample contains information on 24,684 enterprises, with
269,390 firm-year observations.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the firm-level variables used in this analysis. The data
include measures of Output, Employment, and Capital stock, as well as industry affiliation
and regional location. The data do not contain an ownership variable prior to 1993, nor
do they distinguish between minority and majority shares, instead containing codes for 100
6

percent state, mixed state-private, 100 percent (domestic) private, joint ventures, and 100
percent foreign. Virtually all the privatizations in our data are mass privatizations (not lease
buyouts), so the earliest they could have taken place was October 1992, and other sources
suggest that nearly all of these led to majority private ownership (e.g., Boycko, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1995). Therefore we classify all mixed firms as private, together with the other
three private categories. We classify all joint ventures as Foreign private, combining them
with the 100-percent-foreign category, but together they comprise only about one percent of
the sample by the end of the period of observation. The residual category—the difference
between private and foreign—we label Domestic private.
To measure bureaucracy size in each region, we use employment in federal, regional, and
local public administration per 1000 residents, which we term Bureaucracy (with “per 1000
residents” implied), provided for the years 1995–2004 by the Federal State Statistics Service.
This category is far narrower than all public employment, excluding teachers, doctors, and
other state employees not part of the bureaucracy. Included are employees of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government, though personnel of the Ministries of Interior (i.e., police) and Defense are excluded. Approximately three quarters of these employees
are civil servants, with the remainder support staff such as secretaries and drivers (Brym
and Gimpelson, 2004); data for 2004 suggest little regional variation in the ratio between the
two. For some exercises we disaggregate public-administration employment into three broad
categories for which data are available for the entire period 1995–2004: executive-branch
employees formally subordinated to the federal government (Federal executive bureaucracy);
executive-branch employees formally subordinated to regional and local governments (Regional executive bureaucracy); and public-administration employees in other branches of
government (Bureaucracy, other branches), the vast majority of whom work either in the
court system or the procuracy.
Because we estimate an average regional privatization effect—not a separate effect for each
region-year—for most regressions we average public-administration employment per 1000
residents over the period 1995–2004; we discuss possible endogeneity concerns associated
with this treatment just below. We use the log of this measure, and in all regressions control
for the log of regional Population in the appropriate period (e.g., log of average population
over 1995–2004). This specification accounts for economies of scale in public administration
(e.g., Alesina and Spolaore, 2003), which imply that per-capita bureaucracy will be smaller
on average in more populous regions,7 and controls for the direct impact of population
on privatization effectiveness (e.g., through attractiveness to investors, given fixed costs of
investment in a region).
As Table 2 and Figure 1 illustrate, there is substantial and systematic variation across regions in our measure of public-administration employment. This variation appears to be
driven in part by historical experience and other idiosyncratic factors, as it is remarkably
stable over time—the bivariate correlation between any two adjacent years is never below
0.99—and not fully explained by other regional characteristics. In particular, though there is
a general increase in the size of bureaucracies over this period, this affects all regions more or
less equally, as would be the case if employment in any given year were benchmarked against
7

The pairwise correlation between log bureaucracy and log population is -0.85.
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previous-year staffing levels. Moreover, as Gimpelson and Treisman (2002) report, any variation over time appears not to be driven by changes in regional revenues, as might be the
case if variation in economic performance produced variation in public-administration employment. Nonetheless, to assure that our use of average public-administration employment
does not drive our results, we reran all regressions reported below using public-administration
employment in 1995 rather than average employment; the results are qualitatively similar.
The stability of regional variation in public-administration employment suggests little reason to be concerned that bureaucracy is endogenous to regional privatization effectiveness.
Nonetheless, our estimates of the impact of state bureaucracy on privatization effectiveness could be biased by the omission of some regional characteristic correlated with both
public-administration employment and privatization effectiveness. Although our results are
robust to the inclusion of numerous covariates, as a further robustness check we employ
instrumental-variables techniques, identifying the impact of state bureaucracy from plausibly exogenous regional variation in public-administration employment. In particular, we
instrument (log) bureaucracy on log Population density and number of Jurisdictions. These
variables affect the size of bureaucracy through two different types of scale economies, the former because less densely populated regions may require relatively more bureaucrats, and the
latter because regions with more jurisdictions require more bureaucrats.8 As a consequence,
any effect of bureaucracy on privatization effectiveness identified through this instrumentation strategy is likely to operate through incentives within the bureaucracy rather than
through capacity, as bureaucracies that are larger for only these reasons may not be physically more capable of producing public goods or intervening in the economy (e.g., because any
individual bureaucrat would spend more time transporting himself across a Siberian region
than across Moscow). Below we report Hansen J statistics from such two-stage least squares
regressions to test the assumptions that these instruments have been properly excluded.
In addition to log population, in all of our region-level regressions we control for a number of characteristics that may be correlated with both regional privatization effectiveness
and our measure of state bureaucracy. We include (log) Income per capita (adjusted for
regional CPI) and Urbanization, as both variables may affect product and input markets
and so potentially the gains from privatization, and they could also reflect the demand for
shares in the privatization process. Because these variables may in turn be affected by the
success of privatization, we use data from 1992 (income per capita) and 1991 (urbanization),
both before the initiation of mass privatization in Russia, though as we discuss below our
results are robust to using values from later years. We also include a dummy variable (Autonomous region) equal to one if the region is an ethnic republic (nineteen regions) or an
autonomous oblast (one region), as the legal and institutional environment might differ in
regions granted more autonomy.9 In further robustness checks, we also control for a number
8
Bureaucracies might also be larger in less densely populated regions if Soviet planners made disproportionate investments in administrative capacity in underdeveloped and sparsely populated regions east of the
Urals (e.g., Hill and Gaddy, 2003) and if those elites persisted from the communist to the postcommunist
period (Szelényi and Glass, 2003). Note that because log population density can be rewritten as log population minus log territory, we implicitly control for both population and territory when regressing bureaucracy
on number of jurisdictions.
9
Our results are nearly identical if we instead define autonomous region as a republic only. Russia’s
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of other geographic, economic, and political characteristics of regions, as described in Section
5 below.

4

Empirical strategy

We employ a multilevel research design that first estimates regional privatization effectiveness from firm-level data and then regresses those region-level estimates on various regional
characteristics. For the first stage of this two-stage procedure, we follow the estimation
approach of Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) in using program-evaluation techniques to
assess and control for selection bias in the privatization process. Brown, Earle, and Telegdy
show that estimated effects of privatization are extremely sensitive to the specification of
underlying heterogeneity across firms, and they demonstrate that the data imply that firms
selected for privatization not only tend to be more productive on average than firms remaining state-owned, but also exhibit faster productivity growth. Once these two idiosyncratic
factors are taken into account, however, no discernable selection bias remains. A number of
specification tests imply that the specification containing both a firm fixed effect (FE) and
a firm-specific trend (FT) is preferred to specifications omitting these components, and we
thus employ this specification (FE&FT) to estimate regionally varying privatization effects
in this paper. We also permit the technology parameters to vary across industries, and we
include a full set of industry-year effects to control for time-varying industry characteristics
and shocks that may be correlated with both ownership and productivity.
Our estimating equation for the first stage is
xjt = f (kjt , ljt ) + Yγ + wt αj + Fjt φ + Djt Iϑ + Djt Rδ + ηjt ,

(1)

where j indexes firms and t indexes 20 time periods (years 1985 to 2004). The variable
xjt is output, f is a 1 × 10 vector of industry-specific production functions, kjt is capital
stock, ljt is employment, Y is a 1 × 200 vector of industry-year interaction dummies, γ is
the associated 200 × 1 vector of coefficients, wt is a vector of aggregate time variables, αj
is the vector of associated individual-specific slopes, and Fjt is an indicator of whether the
firm was foreign-owned at the end of year t − 1 and φ the associated coefficient. The variable
Djt is an indicator for domestic private ownership, I is a 1 × 10 vector of industry dummies
with ϑ the associated vector of coefficients, R is a 1 × 77 vector of region dummies, and δ
is the vector of coefficients of interest in this paper: the region-level productivity effect of
domestic privatization. Finally, ηjt is an idiosyncratic error.
Concerning the functional form of f , we focus on the Cobb-Douglas function in this paper,
as Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006) show that estimated privatization effects are robust to
alternative functional forms (including translogs and a variety of assumed factor shares). The
estimated functions are permitted to vary across industries, and the inclusion of interactions
federal system includes a number of semi-autonomous regions that are embedded within larger regions.
Unfortunately, our firm data identify only the broader region in which the firm resides, though as we discuss
below our results are robust to controlling for presence of a semi-autonomous region in the broader region.
Missing data for some of the regional variables reduce the number of regions in the data set from 80 to 77.
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between domestic private ownership and industry dummies removes the effect of regional
variation in industrial composition. We always include a full set of unrestricted industry-year
interactions, the Y, which allows different productivity levels for each industry in each year,
controlling for any time- and industry-varying factors such as price changes not captured
by deflators, unmeasured factors of production, and quality differences across industry-year
cells.
Our methods of controlling for selection bias are embodied in the specification of wt . The
FE&FT model with firm fixed effects and firm-specific trends has wt ≡ (1, t), so that αj ≡
(α1j , α2j ), where α1j is a fixed unobserved effect and α2j is the specific trend for firm j. In
practice, the FE&FT model is estimated in two steps, the first detrending all variables for
each firm separately and the second estimating the model on the detrended data. Standard
errors are corrected for correlation of error terms across observations for the same firm.10
Given the very small number of foreign-privatized firms in our data set, we do not attempt
to estimate a separate foreign-privatization effect for each region, but assume an effect φ
that is constant across regions. In fact, as discussed above, Brown, Earle and Telegdy
(2006) find uniformly positive and large effects of foreign privatization across the countries
in their study, in contrast to the quite different effects of domestic privatization that are
our focus. Nonetheless, to assure that our results are not driven by this treatment, we
re-estimated Equation 1, excluding all firms ever under foreign ownership. The estimated
regional privatization effects for this subsample are nearly perfectly correlated with those for
the full sample, and the estimated relationship between state bureaucracy and privatization
effectiveness is almost identical. For conciseness, in what follows we often refer simply to
estimated privatization effects, omitting the qualifier “domestic.”
For the second stage of our multilevel procedure, we wish to estimate parameters of the
model δr = θ + Br ζ + Zr µ + ur , where δr is the productivity effect of domestic privatization
for region r; θ is a constant; Br is log bureaucracy and ζ the associated coefficient; Zr is a
vector of control variables described below, including log population, with µ the associated
vector of coefficients; and ur is an error term with spherical variance σ 2 . We do not, however,
observe δr directly, but instead have an estimate δ̂r = δr + vr from estimation of Equation
1. Our estimating equation for the second stage is therefore
δ̂r = θ + Br ζ + Zr µ + (ur + vr ) = θ + Br ζ + Zr µ + εr ,

(2)

where we define εr ≡ ur + vr and assume that ur and vr are independent. The difficulty
in estimating Equation 2 is that the precision of first-stage estimates of δr will generally
be greater in regions with more firm-year observations, implying that εr will have smaller
variance in such regions. Estimation of Equation 2 by ordinary least squares would therefore
be inefficient and could produce inconsistent standard errors.
We address this problem of second-stage heteroskedasticity in two ways. First, we simply
estimate Equation 2 by ordinary least squares but calculate heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. This produces consistent parameter estimates and standard errors, but does
10

Our analysis of serial correlation in the residuals suggests that the process is not a simple AR(1), and
the lagged residuals are sometimes significant (with varying signs) up to 4 lags, with patterns differing across
specifications.
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not exploit the known variance structure arising from the first-stage estimation procedure.
Second, we employ a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimator first suggested by
Hanushek (1974; see Lewis and Linzer, 2005 and Jusko and Shively, 2005 for recent treatments).11 The logic of this estimator is that more weight should be given to regions where
δr has been estimated relatively precisely, but only to the degree that vr is an important
component of εr .
Formally, denote the standard error of δ̂r from first-stage (firm-level) estimation as ω̂r , and
the N × N estimated variance matrix (where N is the number of regions) associated with the
vector δ̂ as Ĝ. Further, denote the residual for
from OLS estimation of Equation
2 as
hPregion rP
i
−1
2
2
2
2
0
0
er . An unbiased estimate of σ is thus σ̂ =
X ĜX /(N − K),
r er −
r ω̂r + tr (X X)
where K is the number of regressors in the second-stage model, and X is the N × K matrix
of regressors. We then define the estimated variance matrix Ô ≡ Ĝ+σ̂ 2 I for use in FGLS
estimation.
As discussed in the previous section, we check the robustness of our results by instrumenting
bureaucracy on population density and the number of jurisdictions at the regional level.
We present results from two-stage least squares regressions, calculating heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity arising from estimation of regional
privatization effects.

5

Results

We begin by discussing results from the first stage of our multilevel procedure, where we
estimate the region-level productivity effect of domestic privatization from firm-level data.
Because we include both firm fixed effects and firm-specific trends in Equation 1, these
estimates are based on deviations resulting from privatization from the productivity trend
for each individual firm, controlling for industry-year shocks.12 Further, because Equation
1 allows the privatization effect to vary across sectors as well as regions, our estimates of
regional privatization effectiveness control for the composition of regional industry (e.g., that
Tyumen has more natural-resource firms than St. Petersburg).
Variation in these regional estimates is large, ranging from a 46-percent reduction in multifactor productivity in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast to a 40-percent increase in Kamchatka,13
with an unweighted mean across regions of minus 9 percent. Figure 2 illustrates the frequency
distribution of these estimates, and Figure 3 provides a map.
11

Lewis and Linzer (2005) and Jusko and Shively (2005) each focus on the special case in which the firststage sampling errors are independent of each other. That is not the case in our model, given that the δr
are estimated in a single equation. Our FGLS estimator therefore takes the more general form suggested by
Hanushek (1974).
12
Thus, for example, privatization would have the same impact on two firms—one poised to attract
investment, the other burdened with excess employment and declining demand—if it increased productivity
two percent above a positive trend in the first case and two percent above a negative trend in the second.
13
Such outliers are usually smaller regions with fewer observations, implying that these estimates should
be treated with relative caution. Our FGLS estimation does precisely this.
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Table 3 summarizes the key result of this paper, the estimated impact of state bureaucracy
on regional privatization effectiveness. The first two columns present OLS and FGLS regressions of our estimates of regional privatization effectiveness on log bureaucracy (per 1000
residents) and the covariates discussed above. In each regression, the estimated effect of state
bureaucracy on regional privatization effectiveness is large and statistically significant. The
estimated effect of bureaucracy is larger, and the associated standard error is smaller, in the
FGLS regression, where greater weight is given to regions in which first-stage privatization
effects are estimated with relative precision. Controlling for other regional characteristics, a
one-standard deviation increase in log public-administration employment is associated with
a 7–8 percentage-point increase in regional privatization effectiveness. To put this result in
perspective, Brown, Earle and Telegdy (2006), using the same (FE&FT) estimation method
that we employ in the first stage of our multilevel procedure, estimate the impact of privatization to domestic owners in four postcommunist countries to range from minus three percent
in Russia to fourteen percent in Romania. Thus, variation in state bureaucracy within Russia is associated with differences in privatization effectiveness comparable to those observed
across postcommunist countries.
This estimated relationship is robust to changes in specification and sample. As discussed
above, we obtain a similar estimate of the relationship between state bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness if we substitute log bureaucracy in 1995 for the log of average bureaucracy from 1995 to 2004. We also replaced all of our regional characteristics with values
for various years between 1995 and 2004, with no fundamental change in our results.14 Our
results are also essentially unchanged if we run the OLS model having excluded influential observations (i.e., those with large DFBETA statistics).15 Moreover, we obtain nearly
identical results when we include the firm’s founding date in the first stage as a measure
of capital obsolescence (late-developing regions with larger bureaucracies might have fewer
such firms), and very similar results from a one-stage “interaction model,” where we model
the regional privatization effect as a deterministic function of regional characteristics. We
have checked that our results are robust to exclusion of Moscow and St. Petersburg from the
sample, and to inclusion of numerous other covariates, including share of regional output in
resource extraction; regional output and employment concentration; quality of local transportation infrastructure; distance from Moscow; share of population in higher education;
mean January temperature; border region; presence of a semi-autonomous region embedded
within the larger region; proxies for democracy, government transparency, media freedom,
party strength, and governor power; and vote for Yeltsin in 1991.16
14

In particular, income per capita in 1992 might be a poor proxy for local purchasing power later in the
transition period, though we obtain nearly identical results when we substitute values from later years.
15
Checking for influential observations is particularly important in a multilevel context, where estimation
errors in the first stage may produce outliers that drive results in the second. See, e.g., Achen (2005).
16
Given that Equation 1 controls for industry-specific privatization effects, any effect of resource extraction
would reflect the impact of regional industrial structure on all firms in a region, whether such firms operate
in resource extraction or not. Stoner-Weiss (1997) and Hale (2003) focus on the incentive of regional Russian
leaders to promote economic development, highlighting the role of industrial concentration and strength of
governors’ political machines, respectively. Mean January temperature might be correlated with regional
privatization effectiveness if investors were less attracted to inhospitable regions populated by Soviet planners
(Hill and Gaddy, 2003).

12

Our baseline results thus point to a strong effect of bureaucracy size on privatization effectiveness. In principle, this relationship could be spurious if large bureaucracies were also
better-paid, since greater formal compensation may encourage bureaucrats to exert effort
and refrain from rent seeking. To check that this is not driving our results, we constructed
various measures of expenditures on government administration, adjusting for regional CPI
and considering different aggregations across level of government. Although positively correlated with bureaucracy size after controlling for population, inclusion of (the log of) these
measures produces little substantive change in our results, and the effect of the expense
variables themselves is never significant.
Further evidence that bureaucracy size drives privatization effectiveness comes from our
instrumental-variable regression, presented in the last column of Table 3. Both of our
instruments—population density and number of jurisdictions—are strongly correlated with
bureaucracy in the first stage of the 2SLS regression, in a direction consistent with scale
economies in public administration, and the Hansen J -statistic (which allows a test of overidentification in the presence of heteroskedasticity) provides evidence that these variables are
properly excluded.17 The second-stage estimate of the effect of bureaucracy on privatization effectiveness is statistically significant and of a magnitude slightly larger than in the
FGLS regression. This is suggestive of an effect of bureaucracy size on incentives within
the bureaucracy, rather than on physical capacity to implement economic reforms or provide
public goods, as bureaucracies that are larger solely because of scale effects may not have
any greater capacity. Consistent with this interpretation, Shetinin et al. (2005) report that
regional officials in Russia often issue permits in areas where they have no formal licensing
authority, with the cost of such permits less than that of the corresponding licenses from
federal authorities. If firms are able to choose among such approvals, then the cost of acquiring licenses to engage in economic activity could be negatively associated with the number
of regional officials. We present further evidence of this effect in the following section.
In principle, a positive estimated relationship between state bureaucracy and regional privatization effectiveness could reflect two different effects. First and perhaps most obviously, it
is possible that larger bureaucracies improve the performance of privatized firms, while having less impact on state-owned enterprises. Second, it may be that large state bureaucracies
find it easier to meddle in the affairs of state-owned enterprises, thus worsening their performance; to the extent that bureaucrats are unable or disinclined to similarly interfere with
the operation of privatized firms, the estimated impact of privatization on firm performance
would be greater in regions with relatively large bureaucracies. Combinations of both effects
are also possible.
Unfortunately, we cannot evaluate these possibilities in any specification that includes firm
fixed effects, as in any such specification only the relative magnitude of firm characteristics
can be estimated. The only way to address this issue is in a pooled OLS context, in which
17

If we include both instruments as regressors, then the estimated coefficient on bureaucracy is 0.259
(significant at p = 0.155), and the estimated coefficients on both log population density and number of jurisdictions are small and imprecisely estimated. Analogous results obtain if we perform the same exercise with
disaggregated bureaucracy, discussed below, with an estimated coefficient on regional executive bureaucracy
of 0.218 (significant at p = 0.072).
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it is possible to estimate separate regional effects for state and private firms. We therefore
estimate the following equation:
xjt = f (kjt , ljt ) + Yγ + Fjt φ + Sjt Iκ + Sjt Rχ + Djt Iλ + Djt Rν + ηjt .

(3)

This equation differs from Equation 1 in omitting the detrending term wt αj , and in including
separate ownership-industry and ownership-region interactions for state-owned (Sjt = 1,
Djt = 0) and domestically owned private (Sjt = 0, Djt = 1) firms. Given the issues associated
with selection bias in the privatization process, the difference in estimated regional private
(ν) and state (χ) effects is not our preferred estimate of regional privatization effectiveness.
What is of interest is whether the estimated state effect is the same or larger in regions
with relatively large bureaucracies. If that is the case, then the evidence would suggest that
state bureaucracy improves privatization effectiveness by disproportionately improving the
performance of privatized firms, rather than by worsening the performance of state-owned
enterprises.
Table 4 presents results from regressions of the state effect estimated in Equation 3 on state
bureaucracy and other regional characteristics, using the same three estimators as in Table
3. In each specification, the estimated coefficient on bureaucracy is positive and statistically significant. The evidence implies that state bureaucracy does not affect privatization
performance by making state-owned enterprises worse off; on the contrary, bureaucracy is
estimated to improve state-enterprise efficiency. But the estimated effect of bureaucracy on
the productivity of privatized firms is even greater.18 On balance, the hand of the state
“helps” rather than “grabs.”
But which hand? Table 5 reports results from regressions analogous to those in Equation 2,
but with disaggregated state bureaucracy. (Because we have three bureaucracy categories
but only two instruments, we cannot employ our instrumental-variables estimator here.) Of
the three categories for which we have annual data from 1995–2004, only regional executivebranch bureaucracy is associated with privatization effectiveness. This is consistent with an
interpretation of regional bureaucracies as having the most direct influence over the regional
business environment. Alternatively, this result could be driven by variation in the power of
regional governors vis-à-vis the center, if that variation is reflected in variation in the relative
size of regional and federal bureaucracies. However, if we include the ratio of regional to
federal employees together with (log) bureaucracy, then the estimated impact of bureaucracy
is statistically significant as in Table 3 while that of the regional/federal ratio is not. Similar
results hold with regressions where the dependent variable is the state effect estimated in
Equation 3.
The evidence in this section is thus that bureaucracy size, and in particular the number
of bureaucrats employed by the executive branch of regional governments, is associated
with better privatization performance. In the following section we explore two alternative
mechanisms through which this effect might have operated.
18

To see whether regional characteristics might have affected selection bias in the privatization process, we
regressed the difference in the estimated privatization effect from Equation 3 (the difference in the estimated
regional state and private effects) and that from Equation 1 on the same regional characteristics as in our
other specifications. None of the estimated regional effects in this model are statistically significantly different
from zero.
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6

State bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness:
mechanisms

Why do privatized firms perform better in regions with relatively large state bureaucracies,
and in particular, with relatively large regional executive-branch bureaucracies? In principle,
state bureaucracy might affect privatization performance through two separate mechanisms,
which are not mutually exclusive. First, it is possible that privatization was conducted differently in regions with more bureaucrats. For example, it is possible that privatization in
regions with large regional bureaucracies resulted in higher-quality owners, i.e., those who
were more willing or able to restructure. Second, it may be that the post-privatization business environment was different in regions with relatively large regional bureaucracies, such
that privatized firms found public officials more supportive of their efforts to restructure. In
this section we explore the “privatization implementation” and “post-privatization business
environment” hypotheses in turn. In each case we face data constraints that prevent us from
drawing strong conclusions, so the results we report should be viewed as suggestive but not
definitive.

6.1

Privatization implementation

Our data—while comprehensive in terms of firm-year coverage—offer little detail about postprivatization ownership structure. (As discussed above, we observe only whether a firm was
privatized to a domestic or foreign owner; given the paucity of foreign privatizations we
focus on domestic privatization effects.) Nonetheless, we may explore the privatizationimplementation hypothesis through other tests. In the results we report from these tests,
we define bureaucracy as the number of public-administration employees in the relevant
category in 1995, the first year for which we have data and the year most relevant for the
privatization-implementation hypothesis, as mass privatization in Russia was conducted from
late 1992 to mid-1994. However, all of our results are robust to defining bureaucracy as the
average over 1995–2004, as in the previous section.
Our first exercise takes advantage of substantial variation across regions in the proportion
of firms privatized. The Russian privatization program relied on managers and employees
to organize the cumbersome processes of corporatization and initial share allocations, and
the bureaucracy’s primary role was to check that the proper procedures were followed (Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle, 1993; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995). The bureaucracy
thus mainly performed a blocking function in the overall process, such that poorly operating and understaffed bureaucracies might have been less successful in preventing poorly
designed privatizations from going forward, resulting in worse ownership structures and lower
privatization effectiveness.
We test this hypothesis by controlling in our second-stage regressions for the fraction of firms
in each region that were eventually privatized (Privatization propensity). If this variable at
least partially drives the observed relationship between regional bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness, then the estimated effect of privatization propensity should be negative
15

and the estimated effect of regional bureaucracy in Table 5 should decline when privatization propensity is added to the equation, in the limit becoming insignificantly different from
zero. Our results, shown in the first two columns of Table 6, contradict this hypothesis. The
estimated relationship between privatization probability and privatization effectiveness is
not significantly different from zero, and the estimated coefficients on log regional executive
bureaucracy are statistically indistinguishable from those in Table 3.
A second test of the privatization-implementation hypothesis is suggested by a particular
feature of the Russian privatization program. According to Russian privatization legislation, regional governments retained control over privatization of small enterprises, defined
as enterprises with up to 200 employees and one million rubles of fixed assets as of January
1, 1992; all other privatizations were governed from Moscow (Frydman, Rapaczynski and
Earle, 1993). Consequently, if bureaucrats influenced the privatization process for firms in
their regions, this was more likely the case for small than large firms. Evidence that state
bureaucracy—and in particular, regional executive-branch bureaucracy—improves privatization effectiveness more for small than for large firms would therefore be consistent with
the privatization-implementation hypothesis.
To explore this hypothesis, we estimate the following first-stage equation:
xjt = f (kjt , ljt ) + Yγ + wt αj + Fjt φ + Djt Iϑ + Djt Rδ + Ljt Djt Rψ + ujt .
As in Equation 1, we control for selection bias in the privatization process through our
specification of wt . The inclusion of the term Ljt Djt Rψ captures the marginal privatization effect for small firms, measured at the regional level, where the dummy variable Ljt
equals one if a firm meets the definition of small in the privatization legislation, and zero
otherwise. Our interest is in the vector of coefficients ψ: a positive relationship between
estimates of these effects and regional bureaucracy would be consistent with the hypothesis
that bureaucracy influences privatization effectiveness, at least in part, through the process
of privatization itself. As shown in the second two columns of Table 6, however, the effect of all of the bureaucracy variables, including regional executive-branch bureaucracy, is
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The evidence thus does not support the hypothesis that regional bureaucracies influence
privatization effectiveness through the process of privatization itself, as any such influence
would likely be reflected in regional differences in the propensity to privatize or in variation
in the effect of privatization on small and large firms. In the following section we explore
the alternative hypothesis that regional bureaucracies influenced privatization effectiveness
through the post-privatization business environment.

6.2

Post-privatization business environment

Our firm-level data contain no direct measures of business-state relations, so we turn to two
alternative data sets: a Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) survey monitoring the regulatory burden of small enterprises conducted in the spring of 2002 (hereafter
referred to as the “Monitoring” survey), and the Russia sample from the 2005 round of the
16

EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS).
Although cross-sectional in nature, late relative to the bulk of Russian privatization, and far
less comprehensive in regional coverage than the firm data we use in the rest of this paper,
each survey includes questions that can be used to evaluate the regional business environment. The Monitoring sample was constructed from random draws from lists of registered
firms within each region, whereas the BEEPS survey employed quotas for employment, location, industry, ownership, and exporter status.19
We focus on measures of business-state relations that could plausibly be affected by the
size of regional executive-branch bureaucracies, on the one hand, and affect the relative
performance of privatized firms, on the other. For the Monitoring survey, we examine the
relationship between bureaucracy and four “objective” measures of the firm’s regulatory
burden, each focusing on licenses received in the second half of 2001 and each measured
in logs: Average time elapsed to license, Maximum time elapsed to license, Firm’s personhours to get license, and Average license price (including official payment, costs of using
intermediaries and consultants, gifts, etc.). For the BEEPS, we examine measures of the
magnitude of Bribes to bureaucrats and Kickbacks to bureaucrats (measured as percentage
of sales and contract value, respectively) for firms in the respondent’s “line of business,”
as well as categorical measures of the degree of Contract/property-rights enforcement and
the firm’s ability to Appeal administrative violations without recourse to unofficial payments
(i.e., bribes). Table 7 presents summary statistics and complete wording for these measures.
For both data sets, we are forced to draw region-level inferences from a small number of regions: 20 for the Monitoring survey, and 14 for the BEEPS.20 We therefore rely on parsimonious specifications, relating measures of business-state relationships to size of bureaucracy
and regional population (measured the year prior to the survey), as well as to various firmlevel characteristics. Consistent with our estimation strategy in the rest of the paper, we
assume the presence of unobserved region-level effects. This is conservative, as the standard
errors we calculate from these “random-effects” models are generally larger than the analogous heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that correct for arbitrary correlation within
clusters.21
Because we have too few state-owned enterprises in either data set to evaluate the interactive
effect of ownership and regional characteristics, we drop these firms from the subsequent
analysis. Our results should thus be viewed as reflective of the business environment for
private firms. In principle, the regional business environment for state-owned enterprises
might vary either in similar or quite different ways, but privatized firms likely had a larger
motivation to undertake costly restructuring to improve their performance, and therefore
19

We have access only to the first round of the Monitoring survey, conducted in 2002. Previous rounds of the
BEEPS, conducted in 1999 and 2002, include no region identifier. Further information on the Monitoring survey is available at http://www.cefir.ru/ezhuravskaya/policy/Round1_Monitoring_eng_report.pdf.
The 2005 BEEPS data set and related information are available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/
econo/surveys/beeps.htm.
20
We obtain results qualitatively similar to those reported above when regressing estimated privatization
effects on regional characteristics for these subsamples.
21
Donald and Lang (2007) provide Monte Carlo evidence that “cluster-robust” standard errors are systematically too small when the number of clusters is small.
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they had the most to gain or lose from the performance of public officials.
Our primary interest is in the impact of regional executive bureaucracy—the only category
of bureaucracy significantly associated with privatization effectiveness—on the business environment for private firms, though the effect of the other measures may be of some independent interest. Table 8 presents results from the Monitoring regressions. Regional executive
bureaucracy is negatively associated with all four measures, implying a lower waiting time
and cost to obtain a license in regions with more regional executive bureaucrats per capita.22
With the exception of the third model, where the firm’s person-hours to get a license is
the dependent variable, the estimated coefficients on regional executive bureaucracy are
statistically significant. We obtain similar results from other specifications, including OLS
regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors that do and do not adjust for
regional clustering, between-effects regressions, and regressions that include other regional
controls (including income per capita, urbanization, and autonomous region). In all cases,
the estimated coefficient on regional executive bureaucracy is negative, and it is always significant in regressions where the dependent variable is average or maximum time elapsed to
license.
Table 9 presents results from the BEEPS regressions, including marginal effects for orderedprobit regressions where categorical measures are the dependent variable. Regional executive
bureaucracy has a large and statistically significant effect on kickbacks to bureaucrats, with
a one-standard deviation increase in log regional executive bureaucracy predicted to reduce
kickbacks by close to one percent of the contract value. This result is robust to the same
alternative specifications as with the Monitoring data: only for the between-effects regression
does the estimated effect of regional executive bureaucracy lose significance, though the
magnitude is still sizeable. The estimated effect of regional executive bureaucracy in the
other three models is not statistically significant, though always with the expected sign.
Thus, within the limits imposed by the very small number of regions represented in these data
sets, the results here provide some evidence that larger regional executive bureaucracies—
which the regressions in Table 5 identified as that portion of the bureaucracy responsible for
better privatization performance—contributed positively to the post-privatization business
environment, reducing wait times and lowering costs for licenses and government contracts.
In principle, lower wait times could be driven either by increased capacity or better incentives
(i.e., competition among bureaucrats) in larger bureaucracies. In contrast, the relationship
between bureaucracy size and the cost of licenses and government contracts seems more
consistent with improved incentives resulting from bureaucratic competition. Without discounting the numerous frustrations of private firms in Russia in dealing with public officials,
it appears that those problems may be smaller in regions where there are more bureaucrats
with whom to work, with positive consequences for the relative performance of privatized
firms.
22

In a regression of the number of licenses and authorizations possessed by the respondent on the same
regional and firm characteristics, the estimated coefficient on log regional executive bureaucracy is negative
and statistically insignificant. Thus, the lower average waiting time and cost of obtaining a license in regions
with large regional executive bureaucracies does not appear to be offset by a need to obtain more licenses.
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7

Conclusion

In principle, large bureaucracies may work for or against economic reforms designed to
reduce the role of the state. Taking advantage of large variation across Russian regions in
the size of public administrations, we find strong evidence that privatization had a larger
(more positive) impact on firm performance where regional executive bureaucracies were
large. Our analysis suggests that this effect was driven primarily by the impact of state
bureaucracy on the post-privatization business environment, rather than on the process of
privatization itself.
Scholars accustomed to viewing bureaucrats as inefficient and venal may be surprised by our
finding of a positive relationship between bureaucracy size and privatization effectiveness.
Yet inefficiency does not imply that bureaucrats are incapable of providing institutional
support for reform, but merely that bureaucratic capacity may need to be augmented. With
respect to venality, our results point especially to an incentive effect of bureaucracy size,
where rent seeking by any individual bureaucrat is discouraged when bureaucracies are large.
One normative implication of this analysis is that the recent emphasis on providing better
compensation to fewer bureaucrats may be misplaced. Making more officials available to
individuals with business before the state may be the best way to assure that state authority
is not misused.
Strong policy recommendations await further research, however, with a need to examine the
impact of bureaucracy size in other policy and political contexts. Moreover, greater attention
must be given to the direct cost of building a large bureaucracy: this paper has focused only
on the impact of bureaucracy size on reform outcomes. The results of this research will help
to illuminate the tradeoffs involved in choosing the optimal size of the state.
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Table 1: Firm-level variables and summary statistics

Output
Employment
Capital stock
Domestic private
Foreign private

1985
497
(1,464)
781
(2,563)
339
(1,399)
0.000
0.000

1992
617
(5,783)
779
(2,537)
562
(3,218)
0.000
0.000

1998
360
(4,546)
438
(1,728)
664
(15,599)
0.693
0.009

2004
584
(6,083)
452
(1,798)
999
(21,611)
0.659
0.012

Notes: Means and standard deviations. Capital and output are expressed in constant 2004 mln
rubles. Output equals the value of gross output net of VAT and excise taxes. Employment equals
the average number of registered industrial production personnel, which includes non-production
workers, but excludes “nonindustrial” employees who mainly provide employee benefits. Capital
equals the average book value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the enterprise, adjusted for
revaluations. The domestic and foreign private dummies are based on Rosstat ownership classifications as of December 31st of the previous year. The nonmonotonicity of the mean of the domestic
private dummy is due to split-ups of state-owned firms that are subject to later privatization.
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Table 2: Variable definitions, sources, and summary statistics for region-level
variables
Panel A: Definition and sources for regressors
Variable
Bureaucracy
Population
Income per capita
Urbanization
Autonomous region
Population density
Jurisdictions

Definition and/or source
Public administration employees per 1000 residents, Regiony
Rossii, Rosstat
Regiony Rossii, Rosstat
Regiony Rossii, Rosstat
Urban population as proportion of total population, Regiony Rossii,
Rosstat
Dummy variable = 1 if region is republic or autonomous oblast
Residents per square kilometer, Regiony Rossii, Rosstat
100s of raiony + goroda, Regiony Rossii, Rosstat

Panel B: Summary statistics
Mean
Regressors
Log bureaucracy
Log federal executive bureaucracy
Log regional executive bureaucracy
Log bureaucracy, other branches
Log population
Log income per capita
Urbanization
Autonomous region
Log population density
Jurisdictions
Estimated effects
Privatization effect
State-ownership effect
Marginal privatization effect for small firms

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

2.175
1.126
1.512
0.119
7.258
−1.987
0.698
0.260
2.950
0.379

0.243
0.259
0.253
0.319
0.786
0.330
0.124
0.441
1.581
0.198

1.514
0.588
0.578
−0.653
5.303
−2.555
0.270
0
−1.029
0.020

2.883
2.049
2.246
1.359
9.094
−0.982
1.000
1
9.010
1.130

−0.089
1.321
0.080

0.148
0.176
0.333

−0.463
0.683
−0.551

0.401
1.608
1.927

Note: Privatization effect, state-ownership effect, and marginal privatization effect for small firms
estimated from firm-level data summarized in Table 1; see text for details.
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Figure 1: Regional variation in state bureaucracy
Notes: “Small,” “medium,” and “large” are defined as the corresponding terciles of the residuals from a regression of log
public-administration employment on log population.
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Figure 2: Frequency distribution of estimated privatization effects
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Figure 3: Geographic distribution of estimated privatization effects
Notes: Estimated productivity effect of domestic privatization from firm-level FE&FT regression. Estimation controls for
industry-specific privatization effects, such that regional variation in industrial structure is not responsible for regional variation
in privatization effects, as well as industry-year interactions.

Table 3: State bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness
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Log bureaucracy
Log population
Log income per capita
Urbanization
Autonomous region
Constant
Log population density (first stage)
Jurisdictions (first stage)
F -statistic, excluded instruments (p-value)
Hansen J statistic (p-value)

OLS
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
∗∗
0.296
0.144
0.127∗∗∗
0.045
0.012
0.063
0.455∗∗
0.216
∗∗
0.089
0.038
−1.971∗∗∗
0.717

FGLS
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
∗∗∗
0.351
0.124
0.141∗∗∗
0.039
−0.001
0.051
0.458∗∗∗
0.154
∗∗∗
0.110
0.039
−2.219∗∗∗
0.611

2SLS
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
∗∗
0.424
0.183
0.162∗∗∗
0.052
−0.008
0.066
0.506∗∗
0.231
∗∗∗
0.102
0.036
−2.584∗∗∗
0.907
−0.049∗∗∗
0.008
∗∗
0.215
0.098
22.80 (0.000)
0.514 (0.437)

Notes: Dependent variable is estimated privatization effect from firm-level FE&FT regression. Log population density and number of
jurisdictions used as instruments in 2SLS regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported for OLS and 2SLS regressions.
See text for details on FGLS estimator. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.

Table 4: The impact of state bureaucracy on state-owned enterprises
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Log bureaucracy
Log population
Log income per capita
Urbanization
Autonomous region
Constant
Log population density (first stage)
Jurisdictions (first stage)
F -statistic, excluded instruments (p-value)
Hansen J statistic (p-value)

OLS
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
∗∗
0.310
0.146
0.059
0.042
0.058
0.054
0.781∗∗∗
0.213
−0.056
0.042
−0.198
0.609

FGLS
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
∗∗
0.272
0.124
0.061
0.040
0.061
0.051
0.788∗∗∗
0.155
−0.056
0.039
−0.128
0.641

2SLS
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
∗∗
0.347
0.149
0.070
0.048
0.052
0.056
0.796∗∗∗
0.234
−0.052
0.042
−0.378
0.743
−0.049∗∗∗
0.008
∗∗
0.215
0.098
22.80 (0.000)
0.672 (0.412)

Notes: Dependent variable is estimated state-ownership effect from firm-level OLS regression. Log population density and number of
jurisdictions used as instruments in 2SLS regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported for OLS and 2SLS regressions.
See text for details on FGLS estimator. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.

Table 5: State bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness: branch and subordination

Log federal executive bureaucracy
Log regional executive bureaucracy
Log bureaucracy, other branches
Log population
Log income per capita
Urbanization
Autonomous region
Constant

OLS
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
−0.051
0.167
0.242∗∗∗
0.089
0.062
0.099
0.105∗∗
0.051
−0.003
0.063
0.557∗∗
0.225
0.076∗
0.040
−1.579∗∗
0.615

FGLS
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
−0.006
0.144
0.256∗∗∗
0.095
0.051
0.111
0.120∗∗∗
0.043
−0.010
0.052
0.551∗∗∗
0.173
0.097∗∗
0.042
−1.774∗∗∗
0.516

Notes: Dependent variable is estimated privatization effect from firm-level FE&FT regression.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported for OLS regression. See text for details on
FGLS estimator. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.
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Table 6: State bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness: privatization-implementation hypothesis
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Log federal executive bureaucracy
Log regional executive bureaucracy
Log bureaucracy, other branches
Privatization propensity
Log population
Log income per capita
Urbanization
Autonomous region
Constant

Privatization propensity
OLS
FGLS
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
coefficient
error
0.123
0.159
0.068
0.137
0.196∗
0.099
0.205∗∗
0.101
−0.071
0.119
−0.036
0.128
0.154
0.229
0.036
0.167
0.103∗∗
0.044
0.108∗∗
0.042
0.019
0.070
0.007
0.054
0.561∗∗
0.224
0.558∗∗∗
0.186
∗
∗∗
0.112
0.056
0.106
0.051
−1.733∗∗∗
0.555
−1.666∗∗∗
0.562

Small vs. large
OLS
FGLS
Estimated Standard Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
coefficient
error
−0.362
0.370
−0.174
0.325
−0.196
0.243
−0.194
0.243
0.599
0.328
0.438
0.304
−0.150
0.056
−0.262
−0.231∗∗
2.288∗

0.108
0.141
0.459
0.124
1.335

−0.141
0.055
−0.208
−0.187
1.947

0.101
0.127
0.429
0.119
1.255

Notes: Dependent variable in first two models is estimated privatization effect from firm-level FE&FT regression. Dependent variable in
second two models is estimated marginal privatization effect for small firms from firm-level FE&FT regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors reported for OLS regressions. See text for details on FGLS estimator. Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * =
0.10.

Table 7: Summary statistics for Monitoring and BEEPS data

Monitoring data:
Log
Log
Log
Log

average time elapsed to license
maximum time elapsed to license
firm’s person-hours to get license
average license price

Mean
3.330
3.548
2.617
8.786

Std. Dev.
1.176
1.165
1.319
1.768

Mean
1.099
1.973
1
81 (16.0%)
100 (20.1%)

Std. Dev.
1.702
4.332
2
91 (18.0%)
137 (27.5%)

Min
0.000
−0.693
−2.996
1.609

Max
5.900
7.090
6.397
19.742

BEEPS data:
Bribes to bureaucrats
Kickbacks to bureaucrats
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Contract/property-rights enforcement
Appeal administrative violations

Min
0.000
0.000
3
154 (30.5%)
142 (28.5%)

Max
10.000
30.000
4
114 (22.6%)
62 (12.5%)

5
46 (9.1%)
40 (8.0%)

6
19 (3.8%)
17 (3.4%)

Notes: Full wording of Monitoring questions: “On average, how many days elapsed / What is the maximum time [in days] elapsed
between the start of the licensing or authorization procedure and the moment you were officially notified that your request had been
approved or denied?” “On average, how much time [in person-days] was spent by you and personnel of your firm filling out forms and
contacting licensing officials?” “On average, how much did you pay to receive a license or authorization (including official payments,
payments to intermediaries and consultants, gifts, etc.)?” “ Full wording of BEEPS questions: “On average, what percent of total annual
sales do firms like yours typically pay in unofficial payments/gifts to public officials?” “When firms in your industry do business with the
government, what percent of the contract value would be typically paid in additional or unofficial payments/gifts to secure the contract?”
“I am confident that the legal system will uphold my contracts and property rights in business disputes.” “If a government agent acts
against the rules I can usually go to another official or to his superior and get the correct treatment without recourse to unofficial
payments/gifts.” Possible responses for contract/property-rights enforcement: “strongly disagree” (1), “disagree in most cases” (2),
“tend to disagree” (3), “tend to agree” (4), “agree in most cases” (5), “strongly agree” (6). Possible responses for appeal administrative
violations: “never” (1), “seldom” (2), “sometimes” (3), “frequently” (4), “usually” (5), “always” (6).

Table 8: State bureaucracy and post-privatization business environment: Monitoring data
Log average time
elapsed to license
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error
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Regional characteristics
Log federal executive bureaucracy
Log regional executive bureaucracy
Log bureaucracy, other branches
Log population
Firm characteristics
Log employment
Industry (other than food processing)
Food processing
Services
Trade
Agriculture
Construction
Information technology
Constant
N
R-squared between

Log maximum time
elapsed to license
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error

Log firm’s personhours to get license
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error

Log average
license price
Estimated Standard
coefficient
error

−0.063
−1.324∗∗∗
1.085∗∗
0.037

0.548
0.345
0.493
0.213

0.430
−1.077∗∗∗
0.731
0.191

0.552
0.342
0.494
0.214

−0.649
−0.437
0.740
−0.060

0.826
0.491
0.728
0.302

0.464
−1.250∗∗
−0.341
−0.406

0.928
0.576
0.817
0.354

0.187∗∗∗
−0.023
−0.500∗
0.037
−0.424∗∗
−0.190
0.194
0.643∗∗
4.553∗∗
412
0.633

0.058
0.233
0.291
0.218
0.200
0.362
0.243
0.275
2.053

0.213∗∗∗
−0.058
−0.590∗∗
−0.028
−0.541∗∗∗
−0.162
−0.082
0.495∗
2.787
405
0.515

0.058
0.233
0.294
0.220
0.202
0.385
0.242
0.278
2.068

0.208∗∗∗
0.110
−0.018
0.029
−0.277
−0.274
0.012
0.305
3.780
405
0.249

0.068
0.280
0.352
0.267
0.244
0.439
0.293
0.332
2.922

0.175∗
0.187
−0.242
0.305
−0.532
0.819
−0.029
0.266
12.885∗∗∗
376
0.381

0.098
0.383
0.497
0.369
0.333
0.602
0.393
0.455
3.418

Notes: Random-effects regressions, with random effects specified at level of region (20 total). Excluded category is other sectors.
Significance levels: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.

Table 9: State bureaucracy and post-privatization business environment: BEEPS data
Bribes to
bureaucrats
Est.
Std.
coef.
error
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Regional characteristics
Log federal executive bureaucracy
Log regional executive bureaucracy
Log bureaucracy, other branches
Log population
Firm characteristics
Log employment
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transport
Wholesale/retail trade
Business services
Hotels/restaurants
Other parameters
Constant/cutpoint 1
Cutpoint 2
Cutpoint 3
Cutpoint 4
Cutpoint 5
N
R-squared between/log likelihood

Kickbacks to
bureaucrats
Est.
Std.
coef.
error

−0.674
−0.281
−0.172
−0.506

1.266
0.710
1.298
0.543

−0.004
0.783
0.328
−0.004
0.374
−0.128
−0.123
−0.033

0.053
0.063
0.663
0.152
0.346
2.650∗∗∗
0.310
0.211
0.418
0.390
0.294
0.794
0.352
0.368
0.493 −0.188

6.280

5.612

499
0.101

−1.175
−3.030∗∗
−2.531
−1.737∗

Contract/propertyrights enforcement
Est.
Std. Marg.
coef.
error effect

2.192 −0.276
1.354
0.337
2.266 −0.861
0.975 −0.045

0.510 −0.102
0.283
0.125
0.525 −0.319
0.229 −0.017

0.139
1.708
0.911
0.841
1.134
0.789
0.923
1.235

0.052
0.143
−0.167
−0.007
−0.209
−0.076
0.026
−0.201

0.032
0.390
0.204
0.184
0.246
0.176
0.209
0.304

20.434∗∗ 10.016 −1.136
−0.541
0.254
1.022
1.674
466
0.228

2.352
2.350
2.350
2.352
2.355
505
-821.9

0.019
0.054
−0.060
−0.003
−0.074
−0.028
0.010
−0.071

Appeal administrative violations
Est.
Std. Marg.
coef.
error effect
0.223
0.032
0.949∗
0.245

0.515
0.281
0.535
0.235

0.068
0.010
0.291
0.075

0.028
0.024
−0.333
−0.149
−0.008
−0.220
−0.060
−0.534∗

0.032
0.380
0.206
0.188
0.252
0.178
0.218
0.286

0.009
0.008
−0.093
−0.044
−0.002
−0.065
−0.018
−0.133

1.359
2.153
2.935
3.435
4.061

2.408
2.408
2.408
2.410
2.415
498
-795.1

Notes: Random-effects (first two models) and random-effects ordered-probit (second two models, implemented with Stata package gllamm)
regressions, with random effects specified at level of region (14 total). Marginal effects for ordered-probit models are changes (continuous
or discrete) in Pr(outcome = 4) + Pr(outcome = 5) + Pr(outcome = 6). Excluded category is other services. Significance levels: *** =
0.01, ** = 0.05, * = 0.10.

